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It appears that the military-imposed Interim 
Government will be in power in Fiji for a few 
years, with the deadline for a democratically 
elected government to be determined by the 
time needed for the carrying out of a census, 
the redrawing of electoral boundaries, and 
the compilation of the electoral rolls. In 
the meantime, the military has shown its 
firm intention to implement a ‘clean up 
corruption’ campaign. While corruption can 
impose considerable economic and social 
costs and the ‘clean up’ campaign may be 
able to reduce these, it would be an even 
more useful task for the military-backed 
government to implement a ‘clean up’ 
campaign of the economic distortions that 
are holding back the market component of 
the Fijian economy.
‘Cleaning up’ corruption and 
‘cleaning up’ economic distortions
The economic costs of corruption
Corruption is costly for an economy and 
it is very important to minimise it. There 
are various forms of corruption with 
different kinds of effects—with some 
effects much less obvious than others. For 
example, nepotism—which Transparency 
International sees as being widespread in 
the Pacific—does not necessarily result in 
public money passing into private hands.1 
The main potential cost of nepotism to an 
economy is that it results in the best person 
available for the job not being appointed. 
Therefore, the economy is not as well 
served as would be possible if selection 
were made on merit from the pool of 
candidates. Nepotism afflicts civil service 
appointments in all levels of government 
as well as appointments to the boards of 
public enterprises.
Bribery of public officials may not have 
serious effects, such as a bribe to speed 
up the processing of a form or the bribing 
of a police officer to avoid paying a fine. 
However, the acceptance of a climate where 
such bribery takes place frequently makes 
other more serious acts of corruption more 
acceptable. Bribery of a customs officer to 
classify imports wrongly into categories 
that attract a lower customs duty can mean 
avoidance of millions of dollars of tax. Such 
tax avoidance means that the government 
has less money with which to fix roads, 
build schools and medical centres, or make 
welfare payments to the less fortunate.
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In most countries the ‘grand corruption’ 
usually takes place in public works, through 
acceptance of over-tendering for land or 
buildings or materials, or through skimping 
on the material inputs for a project. In these 
cases, large amounts of public money pass 
into private pockets and/or the public ends 
up with a much inferior investment such as a 
road which has a road bed that is not strong 
or deep enough—and which therefore 
requires continuing maintenance—or 
a school with foundations or walls that 
deteriorate rapidly, or even a bridge or 
building that becomes unsafe. The public 
funds appropriated may be spent within the 
country in the form of private consumption 
or investment. More detrimental to the 
economy is where the funds obtained 
illegally are sent overseas and are not spent 
within the economy.
The less well off may engage in some 
corrupt activities, such as lowly paid civil 
servants demanding a few dollars to speed 
up the issuing of a licence, or bribing a 
police officer not to issue a ticket. However, 
it is not the less well off who benefit from 
the grand corruption. The beneficiaries 
of grand corruption are the already well 
off—business people and higher-level 
civil servants and politicians. The upshot 
is increasing income inequality and an 
economy that is not performing as well 
as it should. As Satish Chand has pointed 
out in this issue, poverty is increasing in 
Fiji at a rapid rate. The poorly performing 
economy must be one of the reasons. And 
one of the reasons for Fiji’s poor economic 
performance could well be a high level of 
grand corruption.
So, where corruption is taking place, 
it is very important to minimise it as far 
as possible. However, it is important to 
bear in mind a couple of points. First, 
being inherently secretive, corruption is 
difficult to detect and difficult to prove. 
But these difficulties should not prevent 
the effort being made to sanction those 
responsible. Second, corruption, and bad 
governance more generally, is an outcome 
of inappropriate institutions or lack of 
enforcement of the institutions that are the 
framework around which a society is built. 
Therefore, as much or even more effort 
should go into developing appropriate 
institutions and trying to ensure that they 
are enforced. Otherwise, corruption will 
persist.
Removing economic distortions 
and restraints on economic growth
While corruption has detrimental effects on 
economic growth, the gains from removing 
other constraints on economic growth are 
likely to be much larger than the gains 
from reducing corruption. It is also likely 
that removing these other constraints can 
be achieved more quickly and the benefits 
realised more quickly. Given that the 
Interim Government is likely to remain 
in power for only a few years and that its 
goal is to develop a more efficient and a less 
discriminatory economy that grows strongly 
and with more equitable outcomes, the 
government should focus as much, or even 
more, on removing the other obstacles to 
growth. Because the interim administration 
is a once-only event, and those involved in 
the Interim Government really have nothing 
to lose and can only gain from leaving 
behind a robustly growing economy, they 
should concentrate on this objective.
Removing many of the obstacles to 
economic growth in Fiji is something that 
only a government such as the interim 
administration can do, or can do within a 
reasonable time. The constraints to economic 
growth seem to be fairly obvious. Most, if not 
all, exist because they serve some particular 
political or economic interest and do not 
serve the interests of society as a whole. 
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Therefore, in the absence of the military 
take-over, it is most unlikely that they would 
have been removed any time soon. Indeed, 
under the Qarase administration even more 
inefficient and discriminatory policies were 
being put in place.
So what are the constraints to the 
economy growing robustly, and which 
should be given priority? Because private 
sector investment is the driving force of 
economic growth, the most important 
institutions for the effective and efficient 
functioning of a market economy are secure 
property rights (particularly to land) and 
impartial enforcement of contracts. In the 
agricultural sector, the lack of secure property 
rights to land for non-indigenous farmers 
over the past decade or so has severely 
inhibited investment and led to falling 
productivity in the sugar industry—and 
most likely in other agricultural activities. 
The political impasse over the renewal of the 
agricultural land lease system that served 
the economy so well for so many years has 
been hugely damaging to the economy. 
This damage has been felt both directly in 
agricultural activities but as well indirectly 
throughout the economy by giving rise to 
uncertainty about investment in general. 
The latter impact is not measurable but must 
have been very large.
Putting in place an effective leasing 
system for agricultural use of customary 
land seems to me to be the major priority in 
establishing the basis for strong economic 
growth; and is something that the Interim 
Government could do within a relatively 
short time. It is clear that the resource 
owners wish to have an efficient and fair 
leasehold system. Their willingness to 
grant 99-year leases for resort hotels is one 
of the foundations for the success of the 
tourism industry in Fiji. This willingness 
has been reinforced by the development 
of fair contracts that involve a share in 
the equity of the resort, the provision of 
education and training for the resource 
-owner communities, and employment 
opportunities in the resorts. Such contract 
provisions will ensure that the contracts will 
be honoured by the landowners, as they will 
not strike against their own assets.
As I have suggested in the past, a new 
agricultural leasehold system should be 
market-based for the setting of the lease 
rentals and any other payments such as 
goodwill. As I have also suggested, the 
Native Land Trust Board as the trustee for 
the landowners has served its time. The 
landowners should be allowed to manage 
their own resources, including the leasing 
of land, otherwise they will never develop 
the needed expertise.
The impartial enforcement of contracts, 
the other basic requirement for the effective 
functioning of a market economy, needs the 
full and non-discriminating support of the 
government and an effective and impartial 
legal system. If contracts made in good 
faith are not effectively enforced, the result 
is a reduction in investment and business 
activity. Investors will go to countries where 
contracts are effectively enforced. Long-
term authoritarian regimes, such as in Chile, 
Indonesia, China and Vietnam, recognised 
the necessity of secure property rights 
and contract enforcement for economic 
growth and achieved a record of high rates 
of growth over a long period. However, 
meeting these objectives is at the whim 
of the regime. When the regime no longer 
exists, the arrangements usually collapse. 
Such a collapse is evident in Indonesia 
following the removal of the Soeharto 
regime. Since the removal of Soeharto, a 
great deal of attention has been paid in 
Indonesia to putting in place the principles 
of democracy; but little attention has been 
given to reforming the bureaucracy and the 
judiciary and to seeing that arrangements 
for ensuring secure property rights and 
impartial contract enforcement are in place 
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(see Duncan and McLeod 2007). As a result, 
the economy has not been performing very 
well, with investment reluctant to return.
The lesson to learn from these successful 
authoritarian regimes is not to adopt 
an authoritarian regime but to have a 
democratic regime that provides the basic 
economic institutions needed for the private 
sector to operate effectively. An essential 
difference between an authoritarian regime 
such as Indonesia, which was able to have 
sustained strong economic growth, and a 
democracy that achieves the same results 
is that when the authoritarian regime 
collapses the property rights and contract 
enforcement that sustained the growth no 
longer exist and must be created again. So 
far, Indonesia has not been able to achieve 
this transformation. In contrast, Chile was 
able to make the successful transition from 
an authoritarian regime to a democracy that 
has in place the institutions essential to good 
economic growth.
Fiji’s ranking of 86th out of 175 countries 
with respect to the Costs of Enforcing 
Contracts shows that much still has be done 
to create an encouraging environment for 
investors (World Bank and International 
Finance Corporation 2006). In this World 
Bank report it is estimated that, on average, 
enforcing a contract in Fiji requires 26 
procedures, takes 397 days, and costs 62 per 
cent of the claim. These figures show that the 
court system is not working well. The interim 
administration should make impartial and 
efficient enforcement of contracts another 
reform priority. Therefore, it should see 
that the court system becomes much more 
efficient and that it makes well known that 
the government and the bureaucracy will 
not intervene in any contract dispute; that 
contract disputes are matters for the court 
system. This is an important standard to put 
in place for future governments.
Other actions that are necessary to 
remove constraints leading to the low rate 
of private investment in Fiji and which 
must be taken if Fiji is to have sustained, 
robust economic growth are the following: 
privatisation of government business 
enterprises and essential services, removal 
of tariffs and other import restrictions, 
reducing the power of labour unions, 
removing tax holidays for investment, and 
making affirmative action programs less 
discriminatory.
Government business enterprises 
and essential services utilities have a 
very poor record in Fiji. Yet the private 
sector is highly reliant upon them for 
the infrastructure needed to carry on 
business efficiently. Unfortunately, most 
government business enterprises have a 
record of loss-making, they take up much 
of government investment, and their boards 
reflect nepotism, conflicts of interest, and 
lack of expertise in the enterprises’ activities. 
There appear to be good reasons for the 
majority, if not all, to be privatised.
The Interim Government has already 
followed the recommendations that came 
out of the Prime Minister’s Summit on 
Corporate Governance held on 11–12 March 
2005. The recommendations that were sent 
to the Qarase administration included 
reducing the number of board appointments 
a director could hold, requiring appropriate 
expertise from board members, reducing 
the size of boards, and ensuring training for 
appointees in board duties to ensure good 
corporate governance. The implementation 
of these recommendations should ensure 
better board performance while these 
enterprises remain in government hands.
The Interim Government has also 
indicated that it will move quickly to 
open up the telecommunications sector in 
Fiji. As I argued a few years ago (Duncan 
2004), by adopting high-cost, monopolistic 
arrangements for the several arms of the 
telecommunications sector, Fiji effectively 
locked itself out of the industrial revolution 
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sweeping the world. This revolution has 
relied on low-cost telecommunications. 
There have to be doubts that as a ‘late 
starter’ Fiji can now benefit greatly from 
attracting overseas activities by opening 
up its telecommunications sector and 
lowering prices. Still, substantially lower 
telecommunications costs will be of great 
benefit to the development of domestic 
industry such as agriculture, as well as for 
education purposes.
Opening up the telecommunications 
sector appears to be the essential service 
that the interim administration should 
move on most urgently. Such action will 
have the support of the majority of the 
population. The decision about which other 
government business enterprises should 
be deregulated should be determined by 
a judgment about which activities the 
government (or corporatised body) is most 
ineffective in running. This is an empirical 
question. Global experience—and Pacific 
experience—has shown that governments 
do not run airlines well, nor do they 
run telecommunications services well, 
nor shipping, nor water or electricity 
services. Of course, in many of these 
cases of essential services, such as water, 
electricity, telecommunications, and ports, 
governments have two very important roles 
to play. One is to acquire the land needed 
for the service. The other is to put in place 
the appropriate regulation.
Tariffs and quotas on imports are very 
economically distorting actions that only 
serve the interests of the favoured industries 
being protected and reduce growth. It is 
a difficult concept for the layperson to 
understand, but restrictions on imports 
act as a tax on exports. This can be seen 
most clearly in the Qarase government’s 
November 2006 Budget, which sharply 
raised tariffs on a range of products, mostly 
agricultural, consumed by the tourism 
sector and the expatriate community. 
What the tariffs did was to raise the costs 
of production of the tourism sector and 
make it less competitive internationally. 
The government’s objective was to help the 
agricultural and horticultural sectors gain a 
larger share of the resort hotels’ demand for 
these products. Like many well-intentioned 
actions undertaken without a proper 
understanding of the consequences, the 
effects will have all been bad. Developing 
an agricultural sector behind import barriers 
has been shown over and over around the 
world only to lead to the establishment of 
inefficient enterprises that cannot survive 
without the assistance of the import barrier. 
At the same time, the ‘goose presently laying 
the golden eggs’, the tourism sector, will 
have been hurt.
The tariff increase was not the only 
action of the Qarase administration that 
hurt the tourism sector. In the 2006 budget, 
a turnover tax on hotels was put in place. 
The argument has often been made in 
justifying these ad hoc policies that the 
tourism sector is not contributing much 
to government revenues. But this is the 
result of past governments providing tax 
holidays for resort developers. It is doubtful 
that tax incentives increase the level of 
investment, as is hoped by their proponents. 
Most likely, all that is accomplished is that 
investment is shifted from taxed activities 
to untaxed activities. It was also further 
distorting of investment for the Qarase 
administration’s 2007 Budget to raise the 
tariffs on construction materials from 3 
per cent to 27 per cent while providing tax 
holidays for investment. It would be much 
better to have a completely undistorted tax 
system so that Fiji could develop according 
to its comparative advantage.
Getting rid of import restrictions will also 
help reduce the impact of another constraint 
on development in Fiji, which is the power 
of the unions. Opening up to trade is an 
effective, indirect way of doing this, as the 
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comprehensive trade reforms in Australia 
have shown. Freer trade and the increased 
competition from imports not only reduces 
the prices of goods to both consumers and 
other users of imports such as exporters 
but also reduces the power of unions to 
raise wages in the protected sectors. In 
the long run, the more efficient industries 
that develop will be more labour-intensive 
than the protected industries and therefore 
employment opportunities will increase. 
With the increased economic growth that 
results, incomes will be increased for all, 
including for the labour that will move out 
of the no-longer protected firms.
Public sector unions in Fiji are very 
strong, as shown by the no-redundancy 
policies of past governments when it comes 
to attempting to undertake any reforms in 
the civil service or in government business 
enterprises. Reducing the power of public 
sector unions is likely to be very difficult. 
However, the Interim Government is taking 
on the public sector unions in adopting 
its policy of lowering the retirement age 
as a means of reducing the number of 
civil servants. While this action shows 
that the Interim Government is willing to 
confront the unions, it is fighting on the 
wrong battlefield. Lowering the retirement 
age appears to be a least-best policy for 
reducing the costs and improving the 
performance of the civil service. A much 
better strategy would be to take a close 
look at the civil service and decide which 
ministries and departments are necessary 
for good government and which are not, 
and scrap those that do not appear necessary 
for effective operation of the economic 
and social policies of the country. Further, 
retention and promotion of civil servants 
should be on the basis of merit, not on the 
basis of age. The Interim Government has 
expressed its desire to see the country move 
away from the affirmative actions of the 
past—actions which have operated in the 
civil service since the 1987 coups. Therefore, 
its policies towards the civil service should 
reflect its desire to have an efficient service, 
free of discrimination.
Finally, the affirmative action programs 
adopted by the Qarase Government were 
based on a false premise, as Satish Chand 
(this issue) shows—that is, that poverty 
in Fiji is much greater among indigenous 
Fijians than among Indian Fijians. In fact, 
poverty is just as bad and increasing just 
as fast in both ethnic communities. Chand 
(2007) also shows that there is the strong 
possibility that the affirmative action 
programs have contributed to the increasing 
poverty in both communities. Moreover, 
the affirmative action programs have most 
likely mainly served to make the wealthy in 
both communities even better off—another 
unfortunate, unintended consequence..
There is no doubt that government 
actions are needed to reduce poverty. But 
as experience around the world has shown, 
the best way to do this is to have high 
levels of economic growth. Putting in place 
discriminatory policies that only serve to 
make the already wealthy even wealthier 
is not the way to achieve this goal. The 
poor need jobs, they need good roads and 
transport to get to and from markets, and 
they need good access to education and 
schools. Creating these conditions is also 
one of the ways to have strong economic 
growth.
Conclusion
As shown in other conflict-ridden countries 
around the world, such as Northern 
Ireland, a high rate of economic growth can 
remove much of the basis for the conflict 
and lead to peaceful reconciliation. The 
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opposite is clearly true. Rural indigenous 
Fijians justly feel anger at the long-term 
lack of development of essential services 
and provision of better access to health 
and education services. When people feel 
such anger they lash out irrationally at 
anyone who is different and who they 
think may be receiving benefits that they 
are not. The failure of the Fijian economy 
to grow at a rate rapid enough to provide 
the government with increasing revenues 
for the provision of essential government 
services, particularly to rural areas, is largely 
the fault of government interventions in the 
economy.
Once granted, these interventions—
usually comprising favours to particular 
interest groups—are very difficult to 
remove. The 2006 coup and the Interim 
Government that will likely be in power for 
a few years, offers an opportunity to ‘clean 
up’ the economy so that it can function free 
of distortions. I am reminded of Mancur 
Olson’s theory about why the southern part 
of the United States has, for a long time, 
grown at a faster rate than the north (Olson 
1982). Olson argued that the destruction of 
the South by the Northern army destroyed 
not only buildings but also wiped out all 
the regulations that had been put in place 
by governments over the years to serve one 
favoured interest group or other, and that 
had led to a ‘fossilisation’ of the economy. 
Following the destruction, the South was 
freed of all the regulations inhibiting the 
private sector. Even today, the South is 
seen as a much more open economy than 
the North.
Just as I am sure that Mancur Olson 
would not have suggested the destruction 
of the US South in order to achieve this 
goal, I am certainly not recommending 
coups where government regulations and 
policies are stifling enterprise. However, 
given that the coup has taken place and the 
interim administration wishes to see a much 
more efficient, less discriminatory, more 
equitable, and faster growing economy 
establishing, I am suggesting actions that it 
seems that only such an administration can 
achieve in a relatively short period of time. 
The alternative seems to be a continuation 
of the inefficient, discriminatory, slowly 
growing economy, which is sure to lead to 
even more conflict in the future—not only 
conflict that is based on ethnicity but also 
conflict between the haves and the have 
nots.
Therefore, my priority list for the 
economic ‘clean up’ campaign is the 
following. First, immediately remove all 
customs duty increases announced in the 
2007 Qarase Budget; and later, remove 
all tariffs. Second, as soon as possible, 
establish a new, even more effective, 
agricultural leasehold system for customary 
land. Third, put in place a more efficient 
court system for settling commercial 
disputes and announce a promise that the 
government will not interfere in contract 
disputes. Finally, as soon as possible, 
privatise the telecommunications system 
and quickly work towards privatising the 
most inefficient of the other government 
business enterprises.
Notes
1 Transparency International (2004) reported 
that kickbacks for public services, bribery 
of public officials (for example, customs 
and income tax), nepotism, undue influence 
of public officials, inappropriate public 
procurement, abuse of public funds, and 
conflicts of interest were prevalent in Fiji.
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